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Abstract
It is suspected that the lack of commercial shipbuilding available in the US
resulting in the consolidation of the US shipbuilding industry as a whole limits the
negotiating capacity for the US Navy and promotes suboptimal contracts that
continuously produce major cost and production time overruns. Several
incentives and contracting strategies are explored to better incentivize, through
formal and informal means, the best value for the Navy in the production of large
ships.
These methods mainly include a sharper focus within the contracts on the scale
and alignment of incentives. Some incentives in use in current contracts were
found to be counterproductive to the goals of reduced cost, timeliness, and
quality because of the disproportionate scaling of one goal's incentive over the
others. Once the shareline incentive is lost as in the LPD 17 program, there is
much less of a need for the shipbuilder to control costs. Also, a redirection of
resources spent on smaller incentives in order to increase larger incentives such
as larger order quantities is suggested.
These improvements, however, might only lead to a marginal effect in contract
efficiency at best. In order to produce a larger effect, the competitive base in the
shipbuilding industry must be increased. This increase in the competitive base is
possible through a large capital investment into an existing tier 2 shipyard in
order to increase its production capabilities to the level of a tier 1 shipyard.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview
This thesis looks at current contract incentives written into shipbuilding contracts
in order to identify and better align incentives between the shipbuilding industry
and the US Navy. An alignment of these incentives is meant to produce a
reduction in cost of ships for the Navy while maintaining a required level of
quality and timeliness in the production of those ships and long-term production
capabilities at commercially owned shipyards. The incentives are classified as
either relational contracts (i.e. informal agreements sustained by the shadow of
the future') or formal contracts (i.e. the kind that can be enforced by courts or
some observing third party). Those contracts are viewed through the lens of
lessons learned from both principal-agent and game theory models. This lens is
applied in hopes of discerning additional and potentially innovative methods for
applying incentive structures in shipbuilding contracts.
Four recent (within the last 20 years) Naval construction contracts are identified
for examination and analysis: Littoral Combat Ship, LPD-17, Virginia Class
Submarine, and DDG 1000. The degree of success of these contracts can be
judged based on their ability not to exceed a 15% increase over initial estimated
cost, a timely delivery component, and overall quality of the end product.
These contracts provide examples of two seemingly different contract structures
used consistently and canonically in current shipbuilding contracts. The overall
contract structures used are Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) and Cost Plus Award
Fee (CPAF). Though there are only two high level types of contract structures,
each contract type has substantial design freedom by implementing different
incentive allocations that create additional complexities to be analyzed in
particular situations. Those incentive allocations might show ostensibly across a
spectrum of specific transactions such as pay for performance or time dependent
structures and provisions for initial and subsequent contract awards.
1 Gibbons, R., Henderson, R. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities", Articles in
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The shipbuilding industry is an imperfect market where free market competition is
not the main driver of performance. The market is characterized by a
combination on monopsony 2 (only a single buyer) and oligopoly 3 (only few
sellers). In a monopsony situation, the buyer usually maintains all of the power to
adjust prices since the seller has no alternative with whom to trade. The oligopoly
is an opposite balance of power. The shipbuilding industry couples the two
lending itself to the analysis of its intrinsic motivators and equilibrium. The
stakeholders have to be clearly outlined and their baseline motivations
established. Once those motivations are established, then the effects of
incentives on those motivations and subsequent outcomes can be analyzed to
map an incentive to a particular outcome. There are times in which an incentive
is applied to affect a particular outcome, but has either a directly opposite effect
or produces an entirely different outcome. Kerr discusses how this situation can
occur in several industries where a company is rewarded for completely different
criteria than the outcome hoped for by the government. For instance, he
discusses a situation in which a company might have a 10 percent chance of
being fined a million dollars and have to pay for equipment if caught polluting a
river or pay 11 million dollars for the equipment. The company has more
incentive to game the system in hopes of not being caught than paying the extra
money outright. This misalignment is coupled with the probability that the CEO is
incentivized by the stockholders to maximize profit.4
Beyond just an alignment of incentives through contract structure, in such an
imperfect market, there might also be an opportunity for more than just a base
cooperation to create a single entity that might be more beneficial to the whole
rather than just the sum of its parts. This would be the ultimate form of incentive
alignment: full alignment of interests through complete integration. Even some
2 http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business economics/Monopsony.html. Accessed May 2013
3 http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business economics/Oligopoly.html. Accessed May 2013
4 Kerr, Steven, "On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B", The Academy of Management
Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1975). pp. 769-783.
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partial integration between the shipyards and the Navy could potentially change
the entire marketplace and produce a more favorable environment for the Navy
and subsequently the US government. The integration of the Navy with the
shipyards would involve some level of nationalization of the shipbuilding industry
or more fully involved investment from the Navy to include some form of equity
sharing.
In the US, the shipbuilding industry consists of both tier 1 and tier 2 shipbuilders.
The tier 1 shipbuilders are primarily focused on the design and construction of
large complex Navy vessels. These vessels include aircraft carriers, submarines,
frigates, destroyers, and amphibious landing vessels. There are currently only
two tier 1 shipbuilders; Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) and General Dynamics
(GD). The tier 2 shipbuilders are more diverse and take on the construction of
smaller Navy ship projects such as patrol craft and Coast Guard cutters including
other small commercial craft and offshore oil rigs.
This is in large contrast to ship production during WWII. During WWII, there was
a shipbuilding program that led to the production of 5,500 vessels of which 2,710
were the 14,000 ton liberty ships produced by new shipyards in the US. By 1943,
there were three liberty ships being constructed per day. There were so many
ships being produced in the US that new yards had to be established across the
US to meet the demand.5
Currently, the bulk of the large commercial shipbuilding projects are dominated
by foreign shipbuilders due mostly to smaller margins and a larger competitive
base. However, tier 2 shipbuilders might be competitive with foreign companies
in certain instances where they have a particular expertise.
5 Hickman, Kennedy, "World War II: The Liberty Ship Program", About.com, accessed May 2013.
http://militaryhistory.about.coml/od/industrialmobilization/plibertyships.htm
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According to a recent report on the shipbuilding industry conducted by the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces and recent SEC filings, the two publicly
traded tier 1 shipbuilders each held approximately 35% of the total $19B USD
shipbuilding revenues in 2011. 6
Shipbuilding Revenue Distribution
ttunhington
ImgalIs tnc-
GD revenues are compromised of 70% US government sales which owe
approximately 80% to large Navy ship sales including combat systems and
information technology. HII revenues are almost 100% owed to US government
sales for large ship construction due to its spin off from Northrup Grumman as a
dedicated entity for naval ship construction. Repair, maintenance and overhaul
(RMO) of U.S. ships is conducted both at private and public (for nuclear powered
submarines) shipyards and is included in Figure 1.
The structure and size of the shipbuilding industry in the US relies heavily on
government support through large contracts for acquisition and maintenance.
Commercial and foreign military sales are almost non-existent in the shipbuilding
market for US-based companies. The market size is small for US shipbuilders
6 Final Report, Shipbuilding Industry. The industrial College of the Armed Forces. Spring 2011.
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because of competitive advantages of foreign countries, such as lower wages,
less strict labor policies, and increased automation. Reduced cost structures as
shipyard management is improved generally allow foreign companies to provide
lower pricing than their US competitors. However, due to the strategic importance
of shipbuilding to maintaining US military capabilities and self-reliance this
industry has been protected from offshoring in contrast to other manufacturing
industries7. The small market size combined with the capital intensive nature of
the shipbuilding industry makes it less attractive for new entrants, including tier 2
shipbuilders that might consider a jump to the tier 1 segment.
These competitive advantages of foreign companies create high barriers to entry
that limit the commercial segment of the US shipbuilding industry. Because there
is such a limited market for large ship construction only a small number of US
companies maintain the capability (both staff and infrastructure) to perform large
ship construction. The required industrial base for military construction is only
kept alive by artificial means, such as the US code 10 section 7309 and code 14
section 665 - which prohibit the construction of armed forces and US Coast
Guard vessels in foreign shipyards - along with US code 10 section 7310 - which
restricts the overhaul and repair of those vessels in foreign shipyards8 . These
codes along with the Jones Act - which maintains that vessels operating
domestically must be constructed, repaired, and serviced in US shipyards - limit
the availability of contracted ship construction from foreign shipbuilders9 . While
these regulations may limit the competitiveness of pricing for new ship
construction, the current doctrine is that they are necessary to maintain a level of
shipbuilding capability and capacity amongst US companies. This industrial base
is required to provide adequate supply of high-quality ships in order for the Navy
to maintain national security and defense.
7 Berger S. with the MIT Task Force on Production in the Innovation Economy, "Making in
America - From Innovation to Market", MIT Press, September 2013
8 All US Codes could be searched on http://law.onecle.com/uscode/
9 http://www.americanshippingco.com/section.cfm?path=326,346
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The limited market for large ship construction inhibits the entrance of additional
competitors for naval construction contracts beyond the two majority revenue
earners GD and HII. The small competitive base for large ship construction then
puts the Navy at a disadvantage when negotiating those contracts. If incentives
are not aligned well enough between the Navy and its contractors, the result can
be a very expensive and/or a poorly executed contract. The question then
becomes, how do we align those incentives between the Navy and its contractors
in order to improve the cost/performance ratio of shipbuilding contracts? This is
the central question of this research.
Chapter two summarizes important information obtained through the literature
review. The literature review is focused primarily on the work done by Professor
Robert Gibbons in the analysis of principal agent theory and game theory models
as methods to explain behavior by market participants.
The principal agent theory is reviewed initially in order to establish a basis for
discussion. The game theory models then build on that theory by providing
analysis of less straightforward situations where the outcome is based on
additional factors beyond bonus size and a direct mapping from effort to
outcome. The focus for both is on the lessons that both theories provide and how
those lessons might eventually relate to contract synthesis and analysis.
Chapter three discusses the research methodology. Interviews will be discussed
as far as they relate to development of the motivations for both sides of a
shipbuilding contract.
Chapter four discusses findings from both the interviews and the literature review
on the identification and motivations of each of the stakeholders.
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Chapter five will discuss each of the contract types. The initial environment
during the acquisition of the ship as well as the overall contract structure will be
discussed leading into the main incentive structure points of the contract. Those
incentive structure points will then be analyzed for their potential outcomes, both
positive and negative, based on the underlying motivations of each agency.
Chapter six will examine four contract case studies (Littoral Combat Ship, LPD-
17, Virginia Class Submarine, and DDG 1000) for their similar points as well as
point out where each of the programs may or may not have been successful in
the end result. Potential fixes for similar issues identified across multiple
contracts as well as those that are uniquely applicable will be proposed.
Chapter seven will discuss the potential for a union of the Navy with the
shipbuilding industry. This union will be discussed both as a full nationalization of
the shipbuilding industry and as a partial entrance as an additional major
competitor by the Navy itself to increase the competitive base and push the
market more closely toward its free market realization.
Chapter eight summarizes the conclusions gained from the contract incentive
analysis as well as the increase in competitive base and articulates the
recommendations of the thesis.
This thesis could potentially be used by contracting officers and program
managers to form a basis for identifying and analyzing incentive structures within
ongoing and future contracts.
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C apter 2: Literature Review
A literature review was conducted in order to develop a set of analysis tools with
which to discuss the contracts that were analyzed and the interviews that were
conducted. The literature review is focused primarily on the work of Gibbons in
the analysis of principal agent theory and game theory as a starting point for
discussion of incentive structure though there is substantial additional research
into incentive structures especially in relation to compensation.10
The next step reviewed some of the other industry practices and In-Q-Tel as
case studies for what the potential structure of a different role for the Navy in
shipbuilding could potentially look like.
The principal agent theory provides a starting point for the discussion of each of
the contracts. At its most basic point, the interaction between the Navy and the
shipbuilders is a principal agent scenario where the Navy is the principal and the
shipbuilder the agent."
A summation of this theory as a pay for performance model gives the Navy's
value created by the actions of the shipbuilder in the following formula:
y - Navy's value created by the actions of the shipbuilder
10 For example, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) investigate the effects of bank CEO incentives on
the 2008 credit crisis, Borenstein, Busse, and Kellog (2007) how incentive schemes may induce
inefficient behavior through a discussion of natural gas procurement by regulated public entities,
and Jensen and Meckling (1976) use Agency theory to discuss capital structure and associated
agency costs and resulting managerial behavior.
1 Gibbons, R. "Lecture Note 1: Agency Theory", MBA Course 15.903 Organizational Economics
and Corporate Strategy, http://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/. Accessed April 2013.
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a - action taken by the agent
- noise factor beyond the agent's control
In this situation, a ship's quality, timely delivery, and cost are the direct measures
of the Navy's value, though larger benefits to the Navy such as the value of
maintaining surge capacity are more difficult to capture. The actions taken by the
agents as shipbuilders are ultimately the actions that result in the creation of that
value such as expediting their delivery or increasing quality control. The noise
factors are things out of the shipbuilder's control like Hurricane Katrina.12 For
simplicity, we will ignore the noise term.
The shipbuilder receives a wage that is based on a salary or profit margin and a
bonus rate that reflects some percentage of the value that is being created by the
shipbuilder's actions so that:
w=s+b*y
w - shipbuilder's wage based on a salary or profit
s - salary or profit
y - Navy's value created by the actions of the shipbuilder
b - bonus rate
The payoff for the shipbuilder comes from the difference between the wage at a
particular level of effort and the cost associated with creating that value for the
Navy, creating a utility function for the shipbuilder.
u = w - c(a)
u - utility function
w - shipbuilder's wage based on a salary or profit
16
12 IBID.
c(a) - shipbuilder's cost associated with creating value for the Navy
The payoff that the Navy receives is the difference between the value that they
receive from the shipbuilder and the wage that they pay the shipbuilder:
7[=y-w
- payoff the Navy receives
y - Navy's value created by the actions of the shipbuilder
w - shipbuilder's wage based on a salary or profit
It can then be said that a larger bonus rate b or in this case any incentive will
increase the payoff for shipbuilder and strengthen the incentive effect from the
perspective of the shipbuilder. However, there is some inherent risk for the
shipbuilder where the cost associated with creating a certain value for the Navy
c(a) while trying to maximize the wage w is larger than the perceived value from
the Navy's perspective. The risk is larger for the shipbuilder if the incentive is
more heavily based on the perceived value for the Navy. In this case, the
potential risk to the shipbuilder is more than the additional payoff that the
shipbuilder will see from an increase in bonus.
The literature goes further to describe what is referred to as a "multi-task" agency
problem or a "get what you pay for" case. Here the value created for the Navy is
replaced by a performance metric. The payoff for the shipbuilder then becomes:
u = s + b * p - c(a)
u - utility function
s - salary or profit
b - bonus rate
p - performance metric
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c(a) - cost associated with creating value for the Navy
In this case if:
y = a(1) + a(2)
and
p = a(1)
then value for a(2) is lost. In the Navy's case, since their value is defined by the
timely delivery of the ship, the quality of the ship, and a low cost, if the bonus rate
is paid based only on the timely delivery, then only timely delivery is really
incentivized. There is no reason for the shipbuilder to pursue quality or lower cost
since they are not getting paid for those things.
The following numerical example will further clarify these relationships.
Suppose:
a(1) = a(2) = 1
s = 100
b = 100
c(a) = 10
Since:
p = a(1) = 1
Therefore:
u = s + b*p - c(a) =100 + 100*1 - 10 =190
Whereas, if:
p = y = a(1) + a(2) =2
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Then:
u = 100 + 100*2 - 10 = 290
If the performance metric p used to assess the total utility payoff to the
shipbuilder does not include the full value the Navy is searching for, then the
utility payoff is less for the shipbuilder and the shipbuilder is less incentivized to
perform as well.
The principal agent theory as described in this literature gives four main
lessons13 :
1. Stronger bonus rate provides stronger incentives.
2. Stronger bonus rate comes with additional risk.
3. It's difficult to create the right incentives based on objective
performance metrics.
4. Efficient bonus rates depend on scale and alignment.
The stronger bonus rate would obviously provide a stronger incentive. If the
shipbuilder is receiving a larger percentage of the value that it is creating for the
Navy, then the shipbuilder is more incentivized to produce a larger value for the
Navy. With that stronger bonus rate, however, there is also a level of associated
risk. There is additional cost that is associated with creating additional value for
the Navy and as the potentially created value increases so does the marginal
cost for achieving that added value.
For instance, if the shipbuilder's bonus rate for reduced cost of the ship were
very high then the shipbuilder might be moved to make a large investment on
their cost reduction efforts such as Electric Boat did in the Virginia Class
Submarine program when investing in outside consultants to improve their cost
structure. The investment required to reduce costs by a small amount would be
19
13 IBID.
less as it would only involve internal consultants, but to reach a larger reduction,
external consultants were required and the investment was much more. If the
Navy did not perceive the added value or the cost reduction was not large
enough by the Navy's standards, then Electric Boat would have made a large
self-investment and incurred a large cost without any additional payoff.
The issue of risk associated with a higher bonus rate for a performance metric is
also present for the Navy. From the Navy's perspective, however, the risk comes
out of incentivizing the wrong action associated with the performance metric p.
One instance of a misaligned incentive came from a discussion on the cost
performance index incentives. The cost performance index is a measure of what
was budgeted for the project and what the project actually costs. Some programs
found that for a high incentive on the cost performance index, managers had the
tendency to move costs from one project into other projects or defer actually
incurred costs to later periods to maximize the cost performance index. In other
words, there is a risk of gaming performance index-based contracts by allocating
costs in a way that presents the most favorable picture, all the while remaining in
compliance with existing laws and accounting rules.
The last lesson comes from the fact that the bonus rates have to be scaled
appropriately or some effects might be lost in the same way as if the bonus rates
did not align properly with the desired outcome. There is no use in creating
strong incentives for the wrong actions. This is seen in a later discussion on the
effectiveness of additional awards in the presence of much larger incentives on
other performance indices. For example, if cost reduction is incentivized at a
factor of 100 times more than quality is incentivized, then there is almost no
reason for the shipbuilder to increase or maintain high quality since it is almost
completely eclipsed by the cost reduction incentives.
20
Game theory provides the basis to add additional complexity and realism to the
principal agent theory.14 It incorporates a time period sensitive adjustment to the
motivations of both parties. If the interactions/transactions between the Navy and
the shipbuilders are seen as a trust game in a multiple period scenario then the
power of their relational contracts on the relationship can be analyzed.15
Either the Navy or the shipbuilder has the right to honor or betray during the
game (=total contract period). The Navy when it initially proposes a contract can
either trust that the shipbuilder is going to deliver on the contract and proceed
with the contract award or not trust the shipbuilder to deliver on the contract and
not proceed, ending the game. If the Navy chooses to trust the shipbuilder and
the award proceeds, then the shipbuilder can choose to either honor or betray
the Navy. This can take many forms for either the entire contract or only specific
incentives in the contract. If there is an incentive for the shipbuilder to deliver a
ship on a particular timeline, then the shipbuilder could potentially do so while
knowing that the ship is not complete and would eventually need to come back
for additional repair, retrofits or maintenance.
If the shipbuilder chooses to betray the Navy and charges too much for the ship
or does a poor job on the construction of the ship, for instance, then in the next
period the Navy would not trust that particular shipbuilder and either not proceed
with the contract or enforce some sort of punishment on the shipbuilder. Such
punishment could affect the current contract, other parallel contracts or future
contracts. This could potentially take the form of a reduction in future incentive
allocations or reduced number of ships being allocated to a particular
shipbuilder's shipyards for construction. Again, this is a difficult situation to
14 Gibbons, R. "Lecture Note 2: Relational Contracts", MBA Course 15.903 Organizational
Economics and Corporate Strategy, http://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/. Accessed April 2013.
15 This section is derived mostly from the Gibbons and the work done by David Kreps on the trust
game.
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enforce when there are so few capable shipbuilders for a particular scope of work
while still maintaining the necessary capacity for a given ship as well as future
ships. Excessive punishment or even a negotiated contract with a utility value u
for the shipbuilder that is too low could cause that agent or player to withdraw
from the market altogether, further exasperating the lack of competition in military
shipbuilding.
The analysis that the shipbuilder uses internally when deciding whether or not to
accept or reject a certain contract might include a decision tree, as described by
Bertsimas and Freund (2004),16 with each potential outcome including the
probabilities of each occurrence. This could include whether they would indeed
get punished or receive a reduced end payoff. Each end outcome would have an
associated weight to include a component of reputation and professional pride.
The shipbuilder could then perform a backward induction to judge the most
beneficial course of actions.
16 Bertsimas, D., Freund, R.,Data, Models, and Decisions: The Fundamentals of Management
Science, Dynamic Ideas, 2004.
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20% 100
4
Honor 80% 50
Honor 2 50% 100
Shipbuilder Betray 5
1 50% 10
Betray 3 70%
100
30%
10
Figure 2 shows an example of how the backward induction could potentially work
for a given situation. The numbers are based on arbitrary probabilities and
payoffs. In this figure, first the shipbuilder would look at node four and multiply
the probabilities represented as percentages by their expected payoffs to
produce the value of that node. The value of node four then becomes 60 and in
the same way the value of node five is 55 as seen in Figure 3.
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Honor
Honor 2
Betray a 70%
100
30%
10
In this situation, the shipbuilder would choose to honor the contract in the second
period since the potential payoff they would receive from honoring the contract is
more than if they were to betray the contract. The value of node two then
becomes 60. However, the value achieved by multiplying the probabilities by
their associated payoffs at node three gives node three a value of 73 as seen in
Figure 4.
Honor 2'60
Shipbuilder
1:
Betray 3 7
This means that it is more attractive for the shipbuilder to betray the contract in
the first period rather than continue into the second period. Betraying the contract
24
Shipbuiker Betray 555
4 CO0-
in the first period may be equivalent to rejecting an initial or revised contract offer
from the Navy, or accepting a contract without a-priori intention to honor its terms
or with the intention of locking up the work and renegotiating the contract at a
later time. This could be due to several factors to include additional risk in the
second period with increased costs for developing an immature technology or
potential lack of funding for additional ships. Either way, betraying the contract in
the first period creates the most value for the shipbuilder in this case.
Additional factors that would make it potentially more expensive for the
shipbuilder to continue on with the contract include scope increases imposed by
the Navy during the project. A betrayal in this instance would necessarily be to
not comply with the scope of changes since there would be a contracted
arrangement for how changes are implemented and what is the equitable
payment for those changes. The shipbuilder has to implement the changes.
However, a shipbuilder could focus less effort on the quality of additional scope
changes or employ less effort in completing the additional portions for a
reasonable cost. A rule of thumb discussed with a shipbuilder described
cumulative fees associated with changes to the contract in later periods as
accounting for about 60% of the total revenue for a contract.
Here the actions taken by the shipbuilder are driven by the potential number of
periods and the probabilities and payoff distribution. If there were an infinite
number of periods, then it might make sense for the contractor to continue to
cooperate. There is a discount rate r that can be associated with each of the
periods that discounts the amount of future payments to the present value. It
discounts the values in later periods so that those periods are worth less than
earlier periods. If r is too great, then the value of continuously cooperating
decreases. Again, r is changed by the risk and potential future value of the
money not just the inflation rate. If a discount rate of 10% were applied to Figure
2 then the values for nodes 4 and 5 in Figure 3 would be reduced by a factor of
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1.1 resulting in a value of only 54 for node 2 making betrayal in the first period
even more attractive for the shipbuilder.
Defection Payoff = D
Cooperation Payoff = C
Punishment Payoff = P
Time
Figure 5 illustrates the basic example of the tradeoff in payoffs between honoring
and betraying. As long as the time value of the money remains less than the ratio
of the difference between cooperation (C) and punishment (P) and the difference
between defection (D) and cooperation, cooperation remains the best choice for
the shipbuilder (i.e. r<(C-P)/(D-C)), cooperation in the long run creates more
value for the shipbuilder than the short run temptation to betray the contract and
the Navy.
17 Gibbons, R., Henderson, R. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities", 22
December 2011.
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After looking at the literature involving the economic theory for analyzing the
actual incentive structures, the thesis looked to other potential changes to the
current regime that could potentially better align incentives between the Navy
and the shipbuilders.
One of the largest factors identified by shipyard CEOs in a 2005 report18
submitted by the National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP) is the
stabilization of workload for shipyards. The long range shipbuilding plan released
by the Navy for 2014 shows an increase from 282 total battle force inventory to
307 by 2042. In 2005, on average there were four ships per year being produced
in the major combatant area. There are currently between five and ten ships
produced per year in the US. However, the shipbuilding industry needs to be able
to surge to larger capacity. Because of the unstable build rates, there is more
pressure for shipbuilders to exact as much profit from contracts as possible in
order to avoid potential hiring cycle issues and an eventual reduction in the ability
to maintain a skilled labor force. This pressure and contractual volatility also
contributes to the overall unattractiveness of the industry for new entrants from
tier 2 into the tier 1 area for the construction of large complex naval ships.
The lack of new entrants is a major reason for the small competitive base in the
shipbuilding industry. The lack of competitive base produces a sole source
environment in which efficient acquisition through price competition is almost
impossible for the Navy. Currently about 70% of contracts are awarded as sole
source procurements. It is more difficult for the Navy and thus the taxpayers to
achieve the most return on their investment into shipbuilding contracts when the
tier 1 shipbuilders have so much leverage as the only entities with the capabilities
to produce required ships. Apart from the lack of new entrants and sole source
characterization of the shipbuilding industry, there is a general lack of eagerness
18" Proposed Investment Strategy to Address the First Marine International Benchmarking Study
Findings", submitted to DUSD (Industrial Policy) by the Executive Board of the National
Shipbuilding Research Program, 01 Aug 2005.
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to make large capital investments for facilities improvements that could ultimately
lead to more efficient capacity for ship construction.
The NSRP report19 also identifies an investment framework for the Shipbuilding
Industrial Base Investment Fund (SIBIF) with which to address some of those
issues. The SIBIF is a fund to be administered jointly by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Navy the precepts of which include a multi-year
funding profile in order to address and mitigate the inconsistency in build rates
and improve the confidence in the Navy's ability to fund more difficult problems. 20
The initial thought is that a more integrated financial relationship between the
Navy and the shipbuilders could much better align the ultimate goals of the two
entities. If the value created by the shipbuilders for the Navy has a larger
component that is common between the two, then the two would have to be
working harder together for their aligned goals. For instance, if the Navy is both a
customer and a major shareholder, then the CEO of the shipbuilder is
responsible to the Navy on two different levels.
This would need to involve some form of equity-sharing which is not allowed
under the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs) so a new structure would have
to be developed. The case of In-Q-Tel2l and the SIBIF are reviewed for their
structure and how that approach could be applied to an equity-sharing model of
the shipbuilding industry as well as the potential application of a search fund
model for increased competition in the industry.
19 Ibid.
20 "Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study", produced for the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Industrial Policy), May 2005. http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip. Accessed April 2013.
1 In-Q-Tel is a not for profit corporation founded by the CiA in 1999. It incorporates many venture
capital tools including equity sharing approaches to companies that it deems to have a necessary
technology. In-Q-Tel funds them out of the federal intelligence budget in order to help them
succeed in a competitive environment in order to maintain the capability to produce those
necessary technologies.
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It is a combination of these ideas that are used to develop different strategies for
improving the interaction between the Navy and the shipbuilding industry. The
goal is to produce more efficient contracting between the two where incentives
are more closely aligned.
There are many insights to be gained from the Principal Agent Theory and the
Game Theory models discussed in the literature. The most important lessons to
be gained from these models are the ability to identify key incentives and drivers
for both the shipbuilders and the government represented by the Navy. An
element-by-element breakdown of the contract structures is required in order to
view where each stakeholder is gaining or losing its value. Once those values are
identified, it is necessary to think of the relative value produced by different
actions of either stakeholder in order to process how one might react to a
particular incentive structure.
Increased investment into the shipbuilding industry could produce more efficient
contracts and a higher return on taxpayer investment by increasing the
competitive base, increasing productivity and changing the sole source
environment to more of a free market where price competition is possible.
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology
The previous chapter discussed the literature review that was used to form the
thought process that was used to analyze each of the contracts that were going
to be discussed and the overall industry in which the contracts lie. The four
contracts were chosen to give a good sampling of the types of contracts that the
Navy brokers with the shipbuilding industry.
After some initial discussion with contracting professionals within the Navy and
some of the other members of the PIE study, the Littoral Combat Ship, LPD-17,
Virginia Class Submarine, and DDG 1000 contracts were chosen as the most
interesting structures for analysis. Those contracts were viewed as the most
interesting based mostly on their recency and some unique aspects of their
contract/incentive structures. The actual case studies and contract selection
criteria are discussed more thoroughly in section 3.2. Additionally, reference
points could then be developed for what further interviews with the members of a
particular ship program might reveal.
After reviewing the publicly available information, interviews were conducted with
each of the offices in charge of each of the four contracts. This information was
combined with the information obtained publicly in order to develop an
understanding of the motivations considered when the contracts were originally
written and negotiated. The contracts themselves were then obtained. The
contracts' incentive structures were specifically focused on for further analysis
against the motivations revealed in the case studies written about the contracts
and the interviews with the key personnel involved in their individual execution.
The contractual incentive structures and motivations were analyzed using the
tools discussed in the literature review. These tools include the ability to separate
out the actual payoffs or value that each participant in the contract is receiving
and then the ability to relate those payoffs and values to actions that either the
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shipbuilder or the Navy might take or has taken. The analysis tools give a better
awareness and clarity of how different incentives affect the actions of the Navy
and the shipbuilder. The results were then discussed and recommendations were
made for each structure and the industry as a whole. These recommendations
included the discussion of the options for further financial integration between the
Navy and US shipbuilders.
The first step to better aligning incentives between the Navy and its contractors is
to identify all of the key stakeholders in their agreements and their main value
drivers. These stakeholders and value drivers were discussed with contracting
representatives from both the shipbuilding sector and the Navy. There were
approximately 30 individuals interviewed including contracting officers from both
the Navy civilian and military and the industry, acquisition managers, program
managers, deputy program managers as well as senior leadership in contracting
and acquisition for the Navy. Initial interviews and discussions took place
primarily in November and December of 2012. A sample of the questions asked
for each of the programs and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (DASN)
are listed in the Appendix. From these initial discussions and interviews and
information from the literature review, stakeholders and industry motivators were
picked out for their relevance.
Using this understanding of the industry motivations and the literature review, the
structure of the analysis for the case studies and important information for the
contract interviews was established.
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The contracts were treated as case studies and important incentive structures
that were currently being used were identified in order to analyze their effects on
their associated programs. The idea being that we should know where we come
from before we can identify where we could or should go.
The first level of selection criteria for the selected contracts was to provide a
sample from a relevant time period. For this reason, contracts were chosen for
programs that had been acquired within the last 15-20 years. The general lead-
time for a ship procurement to go from a bidding to full acquisition is about 10
years. This additional time period gave a greater availability of information about
how the contract began and a good sample of its performance. It was also
important for the discussion to provide insight into current trends. While it could
be potentially interesting to look at contracts for ships in the 1940s, the industrial
and economic environment do not necessarily correlate to current trends and
many of the key people involved would no longer be available for interviews.
The next level of selection criteria for the selected contracts was that they should
be representative of the most prevalent contract types in US shipbuilding. This
was actually fairly easy since almost all shipbuilding contracts fall into two
categories: Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) and Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF).
Fixed Price Incentive (FPI)
"As stated in FAR 16.403-1, a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract specifies
a target cost, a target profit, and a target price, which is the sum of the target cost
and target profit. The contract also specifies a price ceiling (or ceiling price), but
not a profit ceiling or floor, which is the maximum amount that may be paid to the
contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract clauses."24 The
contract does, however, specify the profit adjustment formula or the "share ratio"
24 https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=6794b407-22e0-4d83-aff9-
80474fc70014. Aprl 2013.
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for both the overrun (cost above the target cost) and the underrun (cost below
the target cost).
Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF)
"A cost-reimbursement contract which provides for a fee consisting of (1) a base
amount fixed at inception of the contract and (2) an award amount that the
contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance and that is sufficient
to provide motivation for excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical
ingenuity, and cost effective management. (from FAR 16.404-2)"25
Fixed Price Incentive contracts are used primarily when the Navy and the
shipbuilders can negotiate firm target cost, target profit, and profit adjustment
formula that will be fair and equitable to both parties and provide an incentive and
ceiling for which the contractor will assume some of the risk. They place a
heavier potential risk on the contractor since unknown costs could potentially
reduce the contractor's share by reducing available underrun and thereby
reducing the incentive pool for the contractor. FPIs are often used for repeat
builds of rather mature designs where prior cost information is available.
Cost Plus Award Fee contracts are used primarily when it is less feasible to
identify potential cost structure and objective incentive structures. This situation
presents itself in the presence of new or innovative technologies that are
implemented on ships. This puts a lot more risk on the Navy since costs are
unknown at the outset and the Navy will reimburse whatever chargeable costs
that the contractor incurs. Risk can also increase when new technologies or ship
types are being constructed since the proper performance metrics may be
especially difficult to discern at the beginning and lead to the wrong behaviors
being incentivized.
25 hftps://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=37757. April 2013.
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The final selection criteria for the selected contracts were that the contracts
should have different incentive structures in order to provide a spectrum for
analysis. The contracts chosen as case studies are shown in Table 1:
DDG 1000 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
LPD 17 Virginia Class Submarine (VCS)
The DDG 1000 and the LPD 17 were chosen mostly for the new technologies
that they were trying to incorporate. They are good examples of the Cost Plus
Award Fee contract situation where it was difficult to set a cost at the outset of
the program because of the new technology integration. They also each had
some unique award structures and final delivery issues. Because of increased
the cost of the DDG 1000 combined with the inability to justify additional funding,
the program was reduced significantly during its acquisition cycle. It was reduced
from a potential of 32 ships to an ultimate delivery of only three. The LPD 17 was
very far over budget and delivered late and before it was fully constructed.
The LCS had a very interesting procurement development. It started with a Down
Select procurement strategy and moved to a Dual Award Strategy, both of which
included a large block buy provision. The Virginia Class Submarine was chosen
mostly for its successful ability to reduce its cost structure and implement a
successful Capital Expenditure plan maintaining the share ratio as the largest
motivator for its shipbuilder. It is especially important as a case study because of
the cost savings it was able to achieve in the same sole source environment
other Navy programs are operating in, while being an extremely expensive
program overall.
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Chapter 4 Stakeholder Findings
For shipbuilding contracts, there are four main groups of stakeholders: Navy,
contractors, Congress, and the citizens. For this discussion, the citizens will be
combined with the interests of Congress and Congress is ideally a representative
of its citizens.
All three of these groups have different objectives and goals, making alignment
of incentives critical in order for each group to achieve their individual goals. In
this situation and from the perspective of the Navy, the end customer is
Congress and the supplier is the contractor. This relationship is represented in
Figure 6. An indirect relationship exists in that contractors give jobs in
geographical areas where shipyards are located and these locations map to
specific congressional districts. There is therefore a complex bi-directional
relationship. For the purposes of this thesis we will, however, only consider the
role of congress in promoting national security while funding the Navy, not its role
in providing jobs to citizens in various districts.
"US Government"
National
LOCEEm MAWNn Shic
Supplier
(Contractors) Navy 
Customer
(Congress)
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The end product is transformed at each transaction step. The product transforms
from ships in the interaction between the Navy and the contractors to national
security in the relationship between Congress and the Navy. The dotted line
encircling the Navy and Congress represents the fact that their interests are
generally aligned as the ships procured by the Navy create the national security
that Congress wants. However, the two individuals can have very different
concerns with regard to the budget for procuring those ships.
The goal of Congress in this regard is to protect its citizens at the lowest cost
possible. With the taxpayers' money, Congress allocates financials resources to
the Navy to allow the Navy to carry out its national security function. In addition to
funding the Navy, however, Congress must also provide funding for other social
services and the other armed forces. The multiple funding requirements make
efficient usage of funds critical to Congress' success. An effective Congress
therefore identifies key programs and allocates the minimum sufficient funding for
those programs to be successful.
Each Congressman is elected by his constituency. This creates a driving force
for Congress to make their constituency happy thereby obtaining reelection. Poor
selection of projects and poor allocation of funds will prompt the constituency to
elect a different representative. To the average citizen the net benefit from
funding Navy programs is only obvious during wartime; Congress would do best
to limit unnecessary spending on Navy projects.
The goal of the Navy is to serve Congress' through protection of US citizens
through direct and indirect military action. The official wording of the Navy's
objectives is "influencing by power and projecting the nation's influence across
the seas to the waters and shores of foreign states both in peace as well as
wartime. "26 These objectives can create a conflicted position for the Navy. The
Navy receives funding from Congress giving it the incentive to maximize the
26 http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1995/drumal72 s95009.html. Accessed April 2013.
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value created per dollar spent by Congress. If the cost of the programs requested
for funding by the Navy grows too large, the programs could potentially be denied
or cancelled. Specifically, there is a provision called the Nunn-McCurdy Act (10
U.S.C. § 2433), which requires the DoD to report to Congress when certain
thresholds are exceeded.
A significant breach to the Nunn-McCurdy Act occurs when the total cost of a unit
in the acquisition process exceeds 15% of the current baseline estimate or 30%
from the original baseline estimate. A critical breach occurs when the cost
exceeds 25% of the current baseline estimate or 50% over the original baseline
estimate. When significant breach occurs, it triggers a report to Congress and
increases the cost growth visibility of the program. A critical breach will result in
termination of the project unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the program.
27
Although reducing cost should ostensibly be in the interest of the Navy, there is
potential for both positive and negative externalities. Reduced cost for programs
creates a better relationship between the Navy and Congress, which might
increase the likelihood of getting future projects approved. However, Congress
may take the reduced cost as a sign that the current Navy allocation is too high
and reduce the size of future funding. For this discussion, it is assumed that the
Navy's goal is to reduce the cost of its programs while maintaining a high level of
quality and schedule adherence. Though the effect of potentially receiving less
future funding is worth mentioning.
The Navy must also develop effective relationships with its contractors. Because
of the Jones Act and other restrictive laws that create barriers to entry for foreign
contractors in the US shipbuilding industry, the Navy must maintain an attractive
environment for those shipbuilders whose main revenue source are Navy
27 Schwartz, Moshe, "The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress",
Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2010.
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contracts in order to keep them in the shipbuilding industry and maintain a certain
level of long-term industrial base for the US in order to counteract potential
wartime situations. The Navy must then leverage its resources in order to satisfy
the financial interests of these for-profit contractors to keep them in the
shipbuilding industry and continuously innovate in order to keep the US at the
forefront of Naval technology. Without innovation from its contractors, the Navy's
.military capabilities would lessen over time and devalue the Navy's contribution
to national security.
The contractors want to produce ships and systems for the Navy that create
value for the Navy and contribute to its mission. The major contractors, GD and
Hil, are however, publicly traded, for-profit companies who are responsible to
their shareholders. GD and H1I need to provide value to their shareholders by
generating profits and increasing returns on investments. Even though there are
only two major players in the US shipbuilding industry for large ships, they still
have to win bids and successfully complete the awarded contracts in order to
generate profits. These two major tier 1 contractors also pass on subcontracts to
suppliers at lower tiers of the supply chain.
Contractors would ideally like to be able to maintain a full yard with a stable
production process to limit the effect of layoffs and hiring cycles. A constant
employment force makes their company more attractive for employees while
maintaining their technical proficiency. That technical proficiency adds to the
"brand" or status of the contractor as a whole. An improved reputation plays into
the successful completion of awarded contracts while allowing the contracts to
lower their bids because the actual man-hours required to complete a project are
less. However, since ship contracts and costs are agreed to by analogy (a ship's
cost is based on what a similar ship previously constructed cost the Navy), a
lowering of current costs charged to the Navy could reduce the baseline for
future projects.
38
Table 2 summarizes the motivations and concerns for the three major
stakeholders in the Navy's shipbuilding supply chain.
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Stakeholder Motivation/Concems
Congress - National Security
- Optimal resource allocation
- Constituency
Navy - National Security
o Technological Innovation
o Fleet Size
o Industrial Capacity
* Full Funding for Projects
- Efficient use of available funds including:
o Level of Quality
o Vessels delivered on Schedule
- Maintaining differentiated value from other services
Shipbuilders - Stable workload
Differentiated capabilities from competitors
- Maximize value to shareholders by maximizing
sharevalue
o Profit = Revenue - Cost
- To +Profit, either +Revenue or +Cost
- Reputation
o Leads to increased Revenue by winning bids
Chapter 5 Contract Case Studies
The goal of the contract case studies is to identify similarities between programs
and methods in dealing with the shipbuilding industry over all and potentially
places where inefficiencies are present and could be improved. The contracts
give a good starting point for future potential innovation.
The following two contracts are classified as Cost Plus Award Fee. They both
include the integration of several newer technologies. These contracts are
especially rich in incentive structure since the additional bonuses are the largest
motivating feature in them.
The DDG 1000 began its life as the DD-21 or "destroyer for the 2 1st century" it
then went through another iteration as the DD(X) where it was classified as
destroyer whose design was in development. It became known as the DDG 1000
or a guided missile destroyer with the hull number 1000. It was meant to improve
the capability to defend littoral waters while incorporating several new
technologies.
The DDG 1000 meant to reduce its crew size from around 300 on most
destroyers and cruisers to 142. The crew size reduction would be possible
through heavier automation and the implementation of an electric drive
propulsion system. The ship also incorporates a wave-piercing, tumblehome hull
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for reduced detectability, a superstructure with large composite sections rather
than steel or aluminum, a new advance gun system (AGS), a new kind of vertical
launch system for storing and firing missiles, and a total ship computing system
to help manage information about the ship.
The estimated displacement was 15,482 tons, which made it nearly twice the
size of most cruisers and destroyers. The first two DDG-1 000s were procured in
FY2007 at an estimated cost of $7,795.2M USD with a third procured in FY2009
at an estimated cost of $3,674.9M USD.2 All ships were to be constructed at
Bath Iron Works, a shipyard owned by General Dynamics with portions to be
constructed and delivered by Huntington Ingalls.
Initially the plan for the construction of the first two ships was to have the first
completed at a GD shipyard and the second at a HII shipyard. As the program
progressed it was agreed that all three ships would be constructed at GD
shipyards and a greater portion of the DDG 51 (another program that had been
increased as the DDG 1000 was decreased) was to be constructed at the HII
shipyards. In 2010, the program experienced a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach.
The Navy stated that the breach was a consequence of the reduction in the
number of ships. The original program was reduced from 32 to 3. This meant that
the $9.3B USD that was allocated to the research and development of the
program had to be spread out over a program of 3 rather than 32. The unit cost
increased by a large amount. 29
Owing to this critical breach, the program was restructured and the new radar
that was supposed to be implemented, the volume search radar, was removed
from the ship design. This removal was estimated to reduce the total program
cost by around $300M USD. After the restructuring, a letter from the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation office, part of the Office of the Secretary of
2 O'Rourke, R. "Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1 000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress", Congressional Research Service. 18 October, 2012. p. 6
29 IBID., p. 50
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Defense), was attached to the certification after the breach estimating a 50%
probability that the program would remain at or below the new estimated cost of
$4.3B USD which was 17% above initial estimates. As of 2012, the first ship was
estimated in a March 2012 GAO report to be 63% complete. 3
The incentive structures in the contract itself included a Cost Plus Incentive Fee
portion for the overall construction and the development of the new vertical
launch system. The structure of these line items was negotiated and modified
from the initial procurement strategy where they would have been treated as
Cost Plus Award Fee. The structure of this incentive fee, much like the fixed price
incentive fee provides for a share line that allocates ownership for both BIW and
the Navy in both underrun and overrun scenarios. The potential for the each of
these contract line item incentives included a maximum of close to 20% of the
estimated target cost in the case of underrun with a minimum incentive of about
7% in the case of large overruns.
Cost above Target Cost is
Profit shared at some % between the
Navy and the shipbuilder
Shareline slope depicts % of cost shared
between Navy and the shipbuilder
Target
Cost
Budgeted funds below Target
Cost are shared at some %
between the Navy and the
shipbuilder
Target Cost
Cost
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The design and research and development of the ship were given incentives
based on a specific award fee. These contract portions were Cost Plus Award
Fee. These line items in the contract carried the most potential risk since it was
here that the new technology implementation was to be included. These
provisions included both period-based and event-based components. Period
award fees are those award fees allocated during different periods of time and
judged for established criteria at the end of the period. They could potentially be
lengthened or shortened, but they are assumed as written into the current
contract. Event based awards are those awards given for specific events or
milestones completed by the shipbuilder.
The period award fee amounts carried a much larger potential payoff than the
event based award fee and included components of quality, schedule/plan
execution, and cost. The period awards are more subjective than the event
based awards. The event-based awards had more specific components or
"boxes" to be checked in their completion. The detailed design for instance was
given both a period based and event based award. The period based award was
subjectively assessed based on quality, cost, and schedule execution. The event
based award had more specific milestones contained within it. The ability to start
fabrication for instance contributed to the amount of the award received.
There were also included in the contract some special incentives of proportionally
trivial amount when compared to the period and event based award fees. These
incentives were focused on a readiness to begin production at a specific date
and the ability to implement of changes within a certain time period.
The DDG 1000 was not a successful program by the cost threshold criteria. The
program had exceeded over 17% of initially budgeted cost and came in much
later than expected. The contractor was still able to receive a large percentage of
the event and period awards stipulated in the contract. This type of incentive was
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again one of the only motivators toward end of the acquisition due to the lack of
potential award along the shareline. The loss of incentive for performance along
a shareline occurs if, for instance, the incentive is for 50% of whatever the
positive difference is between the actual cost subtracted from the target cost.
Once the actual cost meets or exceeds the target cost, then there is no incentive
for cost performance along the shareline and in the case of the DDG 1000 only
the period and event potential awards exist.
The LPD 17 program was initiated in the 1990s in order to replace the LPD-4. It
was meant to improve overall amphibious capability for both combat and non-
combat operations. The amphibious warfare community conducts a large number
of operations in both of those areas.
The LPD 17 design included an advanced enclosure mast system as well as a
new computer program that could enable the ship to be designed in its entirety
by computer programs. The ship also includes several additional stealth features
such as the deck edges being bounded by bulwarks and the anchor and anchor
pocket shaped to minimize backscatter. The ship incorporates several crew
comforts as well such as in rack fans and lap top desks.
The LPD 17s are built primarily by Hil at their Avondale and Pascagoula
shipyards. The first one was procured in 1996 with 10 having been procured
through FY 2010.
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The program experienced considerable cost growth, schedule delays, and
construction problems. Some of these issues can be attributed to the effects of
Hurricane Katrina on the capabilities of one of the HI shipyards, which
interrupted final delivery of the 2005 ship, and the construction of the subsequent
two ships. The third ship of the entire program, delivered in 2000, was the first
ship that was delivered without significant problems. The entire program cost
grew by about 70% over initial estimates and had considerable delays in
production, which were primary reasons for the gap in procurement between
1996 and 1999.
The Navy actually accepted the first three ships in the LPD 17 class with over
1.5M combined construction hours remaining. The reasoning for accepting the
unfinished ships given by the Navy were32 :
- Sooner potential evaluation of problems that could be addressed in later
ships of the class
- Sooner opportunity for the crew to begin familiarization with the ship
- Sooner migration out of the shipyard to avoid schedule and cost impacts
on other ships
- Reduced cost because remaining work could be conducted at repair yards
with lower rates than the new construction shipyards.
O'Rourke, R. "Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options
for Congress", Congressional Research Service, 15 October, 2010.
32 IBID.
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The LPD 17 contract was initially written to include the options for the
construction of the first four ships of the class: LPD 17, LPD 18, and LPD 19. The
construction of these ships was written with an incentive fee similar to the fixed
price incentive contract with a share line to express the allocation of ownership
for both the overrun and the underrun of a target price. The share line would
increase the amount for which the shipbuilder was responsible while decreasing
the potential payoff for the underrun. This is most likely the result of the assumed
increase in proficiency as the shipbuilder spent more time building the same type
of ships (i.e. the presence of a substantial manufacturing learning curve). This
was a phenomenon that was later argued by the Navy in requesting continued
funding for more ships of the class since the LPD 17 had potential for use as the
base hull in a later class of ships.
The design of the ships as well as the construction of LPD 19 had an award
component to them as well, creating a Cost Plus Award Fee structure. The
largest component in the evaluation of these awards came as Period Awards.
The period awards were much less than the potential for award in the incentive
fee on the order of 5-15% of those potential awards. The relative size of
incentives can be seen in Figure 8. Each evaluation period would be evaluated
based on several subjective measures on a performance continuum from
"Minimally Acceptable" to "Outstanding" with an appropriately scaled percentage
of the award feel based on that continuum. The period awards in this instance
also had a few interesting features.
- If the contractor was only going to achieve the minimum fee, then the
Navy could use a percentage of the award fee to incentivize cost
performance.
- The Navy could carry fee up to half of the unearned award fee into future
periods. The Navy always has the option written into its contracts to be
able to de-obligate any unearned award fee.
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- The Period Awards themselves were more heavily weighted toward the
end of the contract.
There was a performance incentive attached to the construction of the LPD 17
and LPD 18. The fee was less than 20% of the potential award fee for the share
line incentives and were meant to reward "special" contract efforts in several
areas including:
- Program Management
- Design Quality
- Subcontract/Vendor Management
- Material Procurement
- Quality Assurance
- Production Processes
- Test Planning/Execution
- Lifecycle Cost Reduction
Each of these criteria would be scored and given equal weighting to provide a
score out of 100 that would be used to scale the amount of the performance
incentive award. These awards were payable bi-annually based on an award fee
pool, which was fairly steadily spread out over the total potential award for each
of the ships. In this case, an unearned fee could be rolled into 1 future period.
Another performance incentive was attached to the LPD 20 construction cost
performance. It was similar to the share line, though there was no sharing
included. If a certain cost threshold was achieved, the shipbuilder would receive
about one percent of that cost as an award. Below that threshold, the shipbuilder
would receive 50% of the difference between the threshold and the actual cost.
Above the threshold, the incentive was reduced itself by 20% for every one
percent over the threshold. (i.e. a two percent increase over the threshold
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reduced the incentive by 40%, but a 1.5% increase over the cost threshold only
reduced the incentive by 20%)
The LPD 20 also had a delivery performance incentive that had both a cost and
time component associated. If the LPD 20 was delivered by a certain date and
still below a certain cost threshold then it would receive about .5% of total cost as
an incentive with a reduction for every dollar above the associated cost
threshold. The LPD 17/18 had a delivery incentive where the contractors were to
receive a fixed sum if the ship were delivered before a negotiated date. There
was no cost component associated with this incentive.
The LPD 17 had several additional possible awards for milestone completions in
the launch and light off phases of construction, compartment completion, and
crew move aboard. The crew move aboard was specifically affected in light of
Hurricane Katrina when the ship itself was used by Navy divers and shipyard
workers for housing during cleanup efforts.
A final contract performance incentive was also included as a potential award
which gave the shipbuilder the potential to recuperate a large amount of any
unearned award fees. This award was to be evaluated after the end of the
agreed upon three year guarantee if no additional problems with the ship were
found.
It was found that the share line had little effect on the motivation of the
shipbuilder since they had been pushed up so close against it. There was no real
continuous motivation because there was such little potential to pursue additional
fees. It must have been similar in the case of the final contract performance
incentive where the ships had already experienced so many problems that there
was no potential for them to actually receive this award. The office in charge of
the programs found that it was necessary to add additional incentives for specific
areas they saw needing improvement in a particular shipyard. This late addition
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of incentives to the contract is not an ideal situation for the Navy or the
shipbuilder. There were no specific productivity investments as in the VCS
program just very targeted incentives to complete a hydrostatic piping test
successfully for instance.
49
The following two contracts are classified as Fixed Price Incentive contract
structures. Though they may contain some additional incentives, the largest
component to the contract incentive structure is the share line with a ceiling price.
In these cases, the total structure of the contract and bidding structure as well as
the pursuit of additional cost reductions and facilities improvements will be the
more interesting discussion.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was awarded as a preliminary design contract in
2003 and the keel for the first ship of the class was laid in 2005. Since then, three
ships have been delivered with a fourth preparing for trials and an additional
eight in various stages of construction. The LCS is a surface combatant built with
modular mission packages so that it can be equipped to handle a specific
mission type at a time. Think; pick up truck of the Navy. The mission package is
what is driving the performance of a particular mission and the LCS is just getting
the package to the right location.
The LCS is designed to be fast and maneuverable with a shallow draft so that it
can reach places that most cruisers and destroyers cannot. The mission
packages are focused on several critical gaps including:
- Mine Warfare
" Small Fast Surface Craft
- Diesel Submarines
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The open system architecture includes onboard sensors, weapons, and
command and control and the incorporation potential for unmanned vehicles.
Initially, two competing designs were created; one by General Dynamics and the
other one by Lockheed Martin. The Lockheed design is a steel semi-planing
monohull and the General Dynamics design is an aluminum trimaran hull. The
LCS displaces about 3,000 tons and has a maximum speed of 40 knots
compared to a little over 30 knots for the maximum speed of Navy cruisers and
destroyers.
The Navy awarded the full final construction to two different shipbuilders. The
design created by Lockheed Martin is built at Marinette Marine shipyard in
Wisconsin. Lockheed is a minority stakeholder in Marinette Marine. The General
Dynamics design is built by Austal USA shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. Austal USA
is a joint venture between an Australian shipbuilding company, Austal Limited of
Henderson, and Bender Shipbuilding and Repair Company of Mobile, Alabama.34
The contracted cost of the LCS program doubled since the initial cost estimation.
Additionally, there have been several quality control issues including hull
cracking, engine problems, and corrosion. The mission modules have also been
seen to require much more time to change between deployments than was
originally estimated. 3
The first proposed agreement structure for the LCS construction contract was the
Down-Select process. The down select process involved taking competitive bids
from each of the two shipbuilders by allowing them to each construct a single
33 O'Rourke, R. "Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for
Congress", Congressional Research Service, 10 August, 2012.
3 IBID.
3 IBID.
51
LCS design first. The most cost-effective and best-performing design was then
chosen for a block of 10 ships to be constructed by the winning contractor. A
second bidding was then held in the second year for five additional ships to be
built by a separate contractor with the same winning design. The winner of the
first bid would also, at the Navy's discretion, construct the combat system for the
second source as an additional incentive. The two sources would then be at a
constant competition for the next phase of construction in FYI 5 as seen in Table 4
(top). Some of the most important points beyond the timing-logistics were:
* Intent for entire block of 10 ships to be built in one shipyard
- Continuous competition for the two shipbuilders for LCSs procured in
FYI 5 and subsequent years
* First bid winner could not compete in the second bid
- Single design after downselect
Ability to use the level of efficiency and cost at one ship yard to
benchmark the other
FYI 0 FYI 1 FYI 2 FYI 3 FYI 4 FYI 5 TOTAL
Winner 2 2 2 2 2
Second 4Downselect 1 2 2 19Source
Total 2 2 3 4 4 4
Contractor
1 1 2 2 2 2A
Dual Award Contractor 201 1 2 2 2 2B
Total 2 2 4 4 4 4
Table 4. Shipbuilding Schedule with LCS Downselect versus Dual Award Structure
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The Dual Award selection process was then proposed along Table 4 (bottom-)
where two blocks of 10 LCS contracts would be awarded to two different
contractors. Each contractor would design its own version of the LCS and pursue
the construction of its own subsequent block of 10 using that design. The Navy
would then be able to abandon either contractor at any point along the proposed
schedule if that contractor was not meeting certain cost and performance
metrics. Some of the most important points to the dual award contract beyond
the timing and major logistics included:
- No orphan LCS ships created
- Potential to neck down to single LCS design providing time for evaluation
- Maximum procurement rate of four ships per year beginning in FYI 1
Understanding the Down Select Contract Structure
As discussed earlier, the Navy was faced with the decision of pursuing a down
select contract or a dual award contract for procuring its LCS fleet. The down
select contract was seen as having the following benefits:
- More competitive bidding, resulting in lower prices (Congress benefit)
- Single fleet type, reducing maintenance costs and staff training due to
fleet commonality (Navy benefit)
- Better economies of scale for contractors, reducing production costs
(Contractor benefit)
- Option to continue use of initial contractor weapon systems, resulting in
cheaper costs and greater profits for initial contractor (Congress and
contractor benefit)
- Single contractor, requiring less logistical and management costs
(Congress and Navy benefit)
- Contractor change every several years, allowing more flexibility (Navy
benefit)
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Although the down select contract seemed like a logical solution from a cost
perspective, there are obvious flaws in this type of structure. The biggest issue is
that the single contractor has enormous leverage, and thus potential for hold-up,
as they will be the only firm providing ships if selected. They could easily lowball
their bid, and once selected, force changes in the contract midway through the
project or even request a potential bailout if things go even worse than planned.
The Navy and Congress would have little choice but to agree with the failed
program or contractor or cancel the whole program and abandon the capabilities
provided by LCS with potential negative impacts on national security.
There is also the issue of no matter how well you define the contract; there are
elements you can't control through formal contracts. How would the Navy be
sure that deeper quality issues aren't present beyond the specifications? There
needs to be some form of control then through informal means to promote that
quality. That could potentially be enforced by the probability of receiving future
work from the Navy as some function of reputation especially in the presence of
many competitors.
The last key issue was that due to shorter contracts, the chances of defection
were greater since the relationship would not be growing over a long period of
time. The contractor has the option to defect on three major areas: cost,
schedule, and quality. A relationship that does not include multiple periods would
increase the probability that the contractor would defect on one of these
elements. The Navy on the other hand could defect by cancelling or reducing
ships, or renegotiating contract specifications. Such a relationship seeds distrust
on both sides and damages the ability to develop strong relational contracts.
Understanding the Dual Award Contract Structure
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The dual award contract was the other contract structure that the Navy was
considering in place of the down select contract for the LCS program. It was
seen as a better alternative for the following reasons:
- Contracts for both ship builders would be longer providing better return on
investment (Contractor benefit)
- Competition between two contractors would keep long-term costs in check
(Congress benefit)
- Common combat systems would allow for standardization of add on
weapons while diversifying risk of creating new hull technologies (Navy
benefit)
- Increased production of ships getting them into service quicker (Navy
benefit)
- Eliminate costs related to orphan ships not selected in down select
contract (Congress benefit)
- Ability to eliminate a contractor if unable to meet cost or design
specifications without jeopardizing ship delivery (Navy benefit)
Beyond these cited reasons, there were a number of other benefits that came
with pursuing such a strategy. With regard to hold-up, now the Navy had two
contractors to choose from so if one contractor had tried to force contract
changes the Navy could shift to the other contractor. The existence of the Navy
as the only major customer of the contractors also eliminated hold-up that would
be possible in usual contractor relationships, as contractors had no other
customers to use as leverage.
This would also address the other big concern that it is hard to manage a
relationship solely through a formal contract. If another contractor is present, the
desire to defect and break the contract is less enticing. The contractor will want
to maintain a good reputation with the Navy so it wouldn't be cut out of the
contract if considerable quality or other issues arose. There is also a greater
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chance of a growing relationship as the contract is longer, thus reducing
defection probability. This lower defection probability would foster a more
trusting and productive relationship, allowing better relational contracts to be
formed over time.
The flaws of pursuing a dual award contract would be lower economies of scale
as you are splitting the contract, as well as less initial bid pressure since two
contractors will be selected. The Navy will also see increased costs in program
management in overseeing two different designs. Although, the initial cost
analysis against both of these showed in a Navy briefing to the Congression
Research Service (CRS) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on March
30, 201136 showed that the dual award contract will be cheaper over the life cycle
of the project as there aren't orphan costs and second sources (sources after
initial contract startup) will experience significantly higher costs related to
learning curve, vendor costs, and rework.
The Dual Award contract structure was eventually chosen for the LCS program.
The contracts were awarded to both Austal USA and Marinette Marine for
construction. In this instance, we see the addition of two new competitors for
large ship builds. In order to do this, Austal Limited used the tier 2 shipbuilder
Bender as a base and then injected a large amount of capital to be able to win
the award by making themselves more attractive and more capable. This is an
instance of a foreign company potentially subverting the Jones Act in order to
participate in the US shipbuilding industry in a major way. A provision was also
included in the contract that Austal would be investing heavily in themselves in
order to improve capability and capacity to the required level for large-scale
production of the LCS. This was most likely a requirement to show the
commitment and future capability to produce the ship at the required capacity.
Interviews with the program office for the LCS and additional reports indicate that
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36 Ibid.
the added competition and the Dual Award structure contributed to the overall
success of the program.
The Virginia Class Submarine is an "attack" type submarine designed for a post
cold war environment. The design leverages several newer submarine
technologies and much of the design effort from the Seawolf Class submarine
which was initially set for a total procurement of 30 boats but was reduced to
three due to the reduced threat environment when the Cold War ended in the
early 1990s.
The first Virginia Class Submarine entered service in 2004. The procurement
schedule was designed as either a block buy or a multi year procurement
strategy in which several boats were contracted at once. This gave the Navy the
opportunity to take advantage of economic order quantities to increase cost
savings by spreading out the cost of each individual submarine and reducing the
marginal cost. The Navy estimates a potential cost savings of just over $3B USD
in net present value owing to the multiple ship procurement. 37
The construction of the ships is divided between shipyards owned by both
General Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls. Although it is not a formal Dual Award
structure, the character of the agreement between the two basically divides the
profits for the construction of the submarine in equal parts between the two major
companies by providing both shipbuilders with components of the submarine to
construct and alternating the construction of the reactor compartment. This
37 O'Rourke, R. "Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and
Issues for Congress", Congressional Research Service, 2 April, 2012.
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division serves two purposes: maintains larger industrial base to ensure that
potential capacity for submarine construction will be met and minimizes the cost
penalty associated with using more than one yard when the procurement rate is
low.38
The program made a large effort to reduce the cost of each submarine to around
$2B USD in order to increase the potential number of units procured. This was
done by changes in the boat design as well the production processes and
reduction in the timeframe the boats resided in the shipyard during construction.
A large part of the cost savings was also assumed to come from the increased
order quantity.
In the VCS contract, special incentives were included in addition to the incentive
on the share line. The potential for special incentives was about 25% the size of
the potential for additional earnings on the share line. The addition of the special
incentives allowed for additional negotiation power with regard to the placement
of the share line and the target costs.
The special incentives included a performance incentive based on
" Design Quality
- Cost Performance
e Drawing Schedule Performance
* Affordability/Producibility
- Program Management
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The performance incentive was evaluated along several periods with a much
higher allocation from the entire incentive fee pool for the performance rather
than the cost. The performance was more than forty times the cost incentive. A
larger cost incentive might have been redundant because of the share line.
The incentive on the first block of ships was focused on the reduction of cost of
design and construction and improvement of submarine capabilities. The award
fee pool was significantly larger than the performance incentive. In the
construction of later blocks, the focus was on schedule performance, total cost
control, reduction of labor and material costs and some additional incentive on
utilizing small businesses. As the blocks of ships procured increased, the focus
was almost entirely on schedule and performance with decreasing amounts
allocated to each of those incentives including a tightening of the share line. The
share line incentive provided a much larger payoff than the other incentives and
actually drove the cost performance of the shipbuilder significantly according to
interviewed sources. This is in contrast to the LPD 17 program in which the share
line did not drive cost performance at all.
There was also a provision for the Navy to allocate a large amount of capital for
the improvement of facilities based on a business case analysis provided by the
shipbuilder. This incentive is focused on improving facility capability to improve
efficiency and potentially further reduce costs. The shipbuilder provided several
case studies in order to justify additional facilities improvements. This is in
contrast to the DDG 1000 program that had a similar clause allowing for
additional capital expenditure included by the Navy for facilities improvements
and other efficiency capabilities of which they did not take advantage. There
were no business case submissions by the company for additional capital
expenditure funds from the Navy to improve production efficiency. This difference
in the drive for cost performance could be a direct result of the contract structure
in which the payoff was driven so much more by the share line. Interviewed
sources also point out that the shipbuilder was eager to drive cost down as soon
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as possible because of the share line and not the schedule incentive. If the
shipbuilder were able to show the projection for a particular evaluation period as
being lower than that, which was expected, then they would be eligible to begin
to receive the appropriate bonus. This maintained a higher level of cash flow in
the program which gives the shipbuilder more flexibility for additional internal
investments and productivity improvements.
Fixed Price Incentive contracts have generally been used in situations where
there are few unknown costs. This would generally preclude projects that
included many new technologies. The VCS program was a good example of the
ideal program for Fixed Price Incentive use. The design itself was leveraged off a
previous design and the shipbuilder was able to focus on the reduction of costs
that were already understood and there was room for the shipbuilder to explore
more creative opportunities for cost reduction because of their high level of
understanding. The LCS was more expensive than originally estimated, but the
estimate was justifiable by the Secretary of the Navy because the hull type at
least was understood. There were several newer technologies incorporated into
the LCS design which would have made it less desirable for a Fixed Price
Incentive contract, but additional competitive base (a second viable supplier)
allowed for more flexibility on the part of the Navy to request this type of contract.
The Fixed Price Incentive generally puts more risk on the part of the shipbuilder
because as we saw in the cost share line associated with the LPD 17,
unbudgeted costs can eventually lead to loss of the ability to gain additional
incentive from that share line. When the target cost is properly estimated,
however, the share line in the Fixed Price Incentive contract can provide a much
larger incentive for shipbuilders to produce a quality product on time at a reduced
cost. There is an especially large potential for cost reduction, but when the added
dimensions of reputation and competition are put incorporated, better quality and
schedule adherence can be achieved.
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Chapter 6 Incentive Analysis
The main values that the Navy focuses on in their incentive structures are the
quality, cost, and schedule. Therefore in the language established during the
literature review, the total firm value:
Y = Yc + Yq + Ys
yc - value associated with cost reduction
yg - value associated with quality improvement or adherence
y,,- value associated with schedule acceleration or adherence
The incentives that are offered to the shipbuilders ideally offer some percentage
of the total value that these value components are supposed to add to the Navy.
The incentives that the previous four contracts included fall into five basic
categories:
- Shareline
- Period Awards
. Event Based Awards
- Special Incentives
- Economic Order Quantity
The total performance on all of the contracts is meant to relate directly to the total
firm value that the Navy receives from the contracts. The total performance is
what the Navy is able to incentivize in order to produce the value that it perceives
from each of the contracts. However, there are several disconnects between
what is incentivized and the value the Navy hopes to achieve.
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The first issue with the incentive structures in these contracts is the scale of
incentives. There is often a very large offset in the performance based on the
cost component of the contract. If the shipbuilder can achieve a certain cost then
they can earn a disproportional amount of the total incentive pool when
compared to the quality and schedule components.
When the potential payoff achieved from the share line, which is only driven by
build cost, is compared to the period and event based awards or the special
incentives that each have a component of quality and schedule in their structure,
the ratio of those incentives to the shareline driven by cost is largely in favor of
the share line and the cost as seen in Figure 8. In other words the contractor will
focus primarily on cost reductions and increases rather than on on-time delivery
or quality.
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Those non-share line incentives also, in a large part, contain a cost element
themselves. So, the importance of the cost of the ship is even further reinforced.
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The cost is so heavily incentivized that it almost doesn't make sense in most
situations to have any other incentives.
The LPD 17 is an example of where the cost incentive itself failed. In the LPD 17
program, the cost escalated and arrived at a level where there was no potential
incentive for it at all. The program then became more difficult to manage than it
otherwise would have been if it had a larger residual incentive to shoot for at
least in the cost area. The program managers found themselves in a cycle where
they had to incentivize individual areas of the shipyard in piecemeal fashion and
the project specifically in order to achieve the performance for which they hoped.
The obvious recommendation here is that the potential incentives be
proportionally scaled to an appropriate level where they are all meaningful. This
is the perfect example of the "get what you pay for" adage because if the Navy
incentivizes the shipbuilders to reduce costs and nothing else then they will work
to reduce those costs without focus on the other areas that the Navy values like
quality and schedule performance. Neglecting quality and schedule can,
however, lead to an indirect cost escalation later on. Otherwise, the resources
that are allocated to the less meaningfully incentivized performance factors
should be removed altogether. If the incentives used are not actually producing
the desired effect then they should not be used and the resources should be
reallocated.
Apart from other issues with the smaller incentives, the period awards have
several issues especially in the LPD 17 contract. In the LPD 17 contract, there
are a couple of specific items that add a level of temporal interdependence to the
other incentives. The awards are allowed to be moved between periods and
weighted heavily toward the later periods.
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These features in the contracts allow the shipbuilder another potential for gaming
the system that could act to the detriment of the Navy. If the shipbuilder's cost
during a particular period associated with a period award is more during that
period, then they might be tempted to push the work off toward the later period.
This could created schedule delays and downstream cost escalation. The ability
to regain lost incentives during later periods detracts from their intended incentive
effect during the current period.
If for instance, the minimum fee that the shipbuilder could obtain in the current
period was 10 if they met the very minimum performance criteria which is some
subjective formulation of quality, cost, and schedule, and the very best they could
do was 100, then they would try to do their very best for across those categories
in order to achieve the highest payoff as in Figure 9.
Honor contract by maximizing
performance in quality, cost,
and schedule adherence 100
Shipbuilder
Betray contract by minimizing 10
performance in quality, cost,
and schedule adherence
Now suppose that the there is an option to meet only the minimum performance
criteria and still gain the additional payoff in later periods. For instance, if the cost
associated with completing the task to the maximum capability is more in the
earlier period than it is in the later period or the risk involved in completing it in
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the earlier period is more prohibitive such as might be the case in some
technology development, then the shipbuilder would be more likely to put more
efforts into the later periods. In Figure 10, the risk associated with completing the
task to the maximum capability is 50% and if the task is completed at less than
maximum capability there is still a 50% chance that the award will be recouped in
later periods. This makes the minimum performance in the current period the
more attractive choice.
Honor in 1st period
10050%
Shipbuilder
Honor in 2nd period
50% 100
Betray in 1st period
50% 10
Betray in 2 nd period
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The value created by betraying the contracting in the first period is then higher
than the value created by honoring the contract in the first period:
Honor in 1st period
50
Shipbuilder'.
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Betray in 1St period
The consequences of such a temporal interdependence can result in an
overconfidence in later periods that ultimately results in an inability to accomplish
initial objectives. At worst it can result in unexpected delays and reduced quality
that produces worse ships.
Because of the risk of potential consequences from the temporal
interdependence components from this discussion, the recommendation here is
that the temporal interdependence be broken. This could be accomplished by
either removing the period awards altogether or changing the award structure to
be steady throughout the ship's construction. Another conceivable approach
would be to weight the early periods more heavily or increase the standards so
that the risk of not receiving all of the awards in the later periods make it less
attractive to delay work towards later periods.
The share line in the traditional Fixed Price Incentive contract focuses the
incentive completely on cost reduction and ideally negates all the other
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incentives that are more prevalent in the Cost Plus Award Fee contracts. In the
case of the VCS program, the awards are more appropriately sized so that one
incentive is not competing with the other. The award fee pool devoted to the
schedule and quality impacts on the program is comparable to the potential
award for reducing cost. However, these were still eclipsed by the potential fee
associated with the shareline incentive.
A difficulty with the share line however is its own structural misalignment. The
share line incentive is based on the savings under a negotiated target cost that
the shipbuilder brings to the table. The issue is that as the shipbuilder reduces
the cost of the ship, they are simultaneously reducing their own profit since profit
is a negotiated fixed percentage considered in the target cost of the ship. As an
extreme example, consider a target cost of $190M USD in a contract where the
shipbuilder would receive a minimum fee of $37M USD or a maximum fee of
$75M USD based on receiving 90% of the positive difference of the actual cost
subtracted from the target cost. In order to receive the maximum incentive fee,
the shipbuilder would have to reduce the ship cost by $83M USD simultaneously
reducing their profit. After meeting or exceeding the target cost of the ship, only
the minimum incentive is available. If there were a 10% profit margin negotiated
into the contract, then the shipbuilder could potentially recoup the cost in lost
incentive fee by more than doubling the actual cost of the ship.
Actual Cost Incentive Fee Profit Net Payoff
Awarded
107M USD 75M USD 10.7M USD 85.7M USD
487M USD 37M USD 48.7M USD 85.7M USD
There are some securities built into the fee structure such as an overrun
responsibility of for 50% of costs above the target cost and total responsibility
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above a cost ceiling, but this example is more meant to illustrate the potential for
gaming the fee.
The structure of the payment incentivizes the shipbuilder to optimize to a balance
between the potential profit and the potential award fee. One way to break the
link that creates the gaming potential would be to not tie the profit to a
percentage of the total cost and instead negotiate it as a fixed sum. Or the share
line slope could be managed such that the overrun is more harshly penalized and
there is no minimum fee owed to the shipbuilder. This creates more risk for the
shipbuilder, but could also be more of an incentive to reduce costs.
However, incentivizing cost reduction too heavily returns the possibility that the
other performance characteristics of quality and schedule are neglected. This is
where increasing order quantity plays a more important role. Block buys and
multi year procurements are all ways that the Navy can incentivize continuous
performance in all aspects that create value in a shipbuilding program. First of all,
it reduces the marginal cost of each ship as the overhead costs are amortized
over a longer period of time and over a larger number of ships. It is then a much
larger incentive than what could be accomplished by an individual ship contract
that it motivates the shipbuilder to not lose the contract by performing in every
instance at their best. The profit on a several billion-dollar program far outweighs
the potential incentive fees for an individual program. A greater incentive
produces more leverage for the Navy and a greater motivation for the shipbuilder
to improve over time. It is also a larger potential risk for the shipbuilder since if it
were to perform poorly on the first ship then it could lose even more money
because of the overhead investment and opportunity cost in anticipation of the
larger buy. That risk would have to be accounted for in a larger profit margin for
instance.
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The LCS program was able to leverage the use of a block buy in order to
purchase ten ships from two different shipbuilders. The program was kept under
its target cost using the fixed price contract with only a well designed share line
incentive and was completed well within its projected timeframe. There were
several quality issues with the first ship of the class, but overall the program has
been considered a success. The large number of ships at stake for the entire
award was an extremely valuable incentive, but after discussing it with relevant
sources within the program, competition was also a valuable resource in the
negotiations with and performance of the shipbuilders.
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Chapter 7 Competitive Base
As previously discussed, there is no true competitive industrial base left within
the U.S. shipbuilding industry. As a result of the lack of competition, there is no
true free market operating within the industry. There are two major shipbuilders
that control the majority of the revenue within the entire industry (see Figure 1).
This gives them a major advantage in negotiations and because their capabilities
are so important, there is less effective incentive for them to produce ships as
efficiently as possible. These large shipbuilders are going to receive large payoffs
and large amounts of work no matter how they perform and they know it.
One solution would be to treat the entire industry as a free market failure and
nationalize shipbuilding altogether. There are several difficulties with this
proposition as seen in other countries. First off, it sends a signal to other
industries that the government could potentially bail them out if they were run
poorly and were relevant enough to the economy. Additionally, it sends the signal
to foreign investors that there is a larger risk in their investments because they
could have to compete with the government directly in certain industries if further
nationalization were to occur. This would result in an overall reduction in foreign
direct investment and ultimately a potential shrinkage in the US economy. This is
a potential knock-on effect from shipbuilding to other parts of the U.S.
manufacturing sector. Based on the market capitalization of Hil and GD full
nationalization would cost around $15B USD. Even with a long-term reduction in
overall cost of shipbuilding contracts owing to a greater incentive for increased
efficiency, the risks associated could make this number difficult to justify as an
initial capital injection.
There are several examples where industries have had similar issues with a very
small competitive base and have worked to increase the competition amongst
different suppliers instead of purchasing those suppliers. The electronics industry
can have these issues when there are very advanced parts that only few
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suppliers can produce due to the complexity of the parts and the supplier's large
manufacturing capability. To increase the supplier base, the buyer uses strategic
contracting or even direct investment in smaller companies to build their
capability and push those advanced parts to become more like commodities
where the competition will produce the best value. The strategic contracting is
often done using a stable long-term project where there will not be as much of a
learning curve or associated risks for the new company. Portions of the project
are allocated to the newer and often smaller company, which gives them a more
stable projection of future earnings that they can use to increase their leverage
for investing in themselves to increase their capabilities. The new company then
has the capability to compete with the larger more experienced companies
increasing the competitive base and the value that the buyer receives from the
purchase of the product.
An example of this sort of investment in the government sector is the case of In-
Q-Tel. In-Q-Tel (IQT) was founded in 1999 to "acquire greater access to cutting-
edge technologies for the US Central Intelligence Agency"39 It's a private, non-
profit that receives most of its funding from the federal intelligence budget. IQT
acts as the same way that a venture capital fund works. IQT scouts out cutting-
edge technologies that could potentially benefit the CIA. IQT then provides the
money that a technology company would need in order to adapt and deploy the
technology to the intelligence community through a direct investment for equity
and then through large purchses of the selected technology. With the CIA as a
definite customer and IQT supporting the company with its investments, the
company can then gain additional support and money from other firms and
acquire additional customers through leverage. IQT's annual budget in 2006 was
approximately $50M USD.*0 IQT uses that budget in order to make individual
investments on the order of $1-3M USD in order to receive an equity position in
39 Book, K., Hardymon, F., Leamon, A., Lerner, J. "In-Q-Tel", Harvard Business School, 25 May
2005.
40 Firmansyah, T., Kantrowitz, A., London, R., Mashhadi, 0., Riggins, M. "In-Q-Tel as an Early
Stage Investment Model", Chesapeake Crescent, accessed April 2013.
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the company. This would allow the company to potentially become self-funding
through its equity investments and exits while prioritizing the issues that the CIA
needs resolved most in the investments. This allows the CIA to align the priorities
of the company and the industry with their own. In order to work with smaller
companies without the more cumbersome Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FARs), the CIA adopted a DARPA-based exemption on "Other Transactions
(OT)" granted to the DOD by Congress which permits R&D agreements outside
of the FARs.4
The Navy might use similar models as the electronics industry and the CIA in
order to create a more competitive base in the shipbuilding industry. Currently,
the Navy allows for a Capital Expenditure provision in its contracts that allows
shipbuilders to add a certain percentage into the allowable costs in the contract
to invest in their own capabilities. This can increase the capabilities of the
shipbuilder and potentially improve the efficiency of the ship's construction. The
capital expenditure provision was used successfully in both the VCS and LCS
programs and also provided that Austal would provide from its own capital in
order to increase its capability.
Austal was an example where a foreign shipyard teamed with a smaller tier 2
shipyard in order to increase its capability and compete with the larger tier 1
shipyards for the LCS contract. Rather than just using a capital expenditure
incentive in contracts, the Navy could invest in a company that would act solely in
the interest of the Navy using a smaller shipyard as a base and building up its
capability to be able to compete with the larger shipyards for a portion of the
more complex ship projects. The Navy would therefore be able to better control
the processes of that new shipbuilder as a major stockholder and potentially use
an equity position in order to self-fund projects. The new shipbuilder would also
provide an increased leverage position for negotiations with the larger
41 Yannuzzi, R.,"In-Q-Tel: A New Partnership Between the CIA and the Private Sector",
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publicationsAn-g-tel/index.htm. Accessed April
2013.
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shipbuilders and push their interests more closely in line with those of the Navy
requiring an increase in quality, cost reduction, and schedule adherence.
A low risk vehicle for the Navy to begin this process is the search fund model. A
search fund allows "an aspiring entrepreneur the opportunity to search for,
acquire, manage, and grow a company."42 In the search fund model, the
entrepreneur locates 10-15 investors of around $30k USD in order to fund a
search for the most appropriate company for acquisition. These companies are
generally valued around $15M USD with established revenue of $4-5M USD per
year. The entrepreneur meets with several companies over 1-2 years and
presents them back to the original investors in the search fund for review and
approval. Those investors get the right to first refusal of whether they want to
provide the necessary capital for the acquisition. The investors provide
somewhere on the order of 60% of the necessary capital for the purchase and
the rest is either leveraged through a bank or through some type of seller
financing. The entrepreneur then maintains about 20% equity in the company
and remains in place as the CEO of the company with a focus on growing the
company out and increasing the value of the company over an average of 5-7
years. At that point, the company is usually sold. As of 2009, search funds as an
asset class produced a 37% IRR and 13.5x multiple on investments. However,
while these returns are significant, there are also 59% of search funds that have
produced at least a partial loss of capital 43
From the Navy's perspective, utilizing a model like this could potentially excite
more entrepreneurial investment in the shipbuilding industry. If the Navy were to
participate in a search fund, other investors would invariably be attracted to the
prospect and add capital. The model is a low initial investment for the Navy with
potential for an equity stake in a growing shipbuilder. This could create a stable
competitor without going towards full nationalization of U.S. shipyards. Through
42 "A Primer on Search Funds: A Practical Guide to Entrepreneurs Embarking on a Search Fund",
Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, 2010.
4 IBID.
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the use of strategic contracts and production sharing with the smaller company
purchased through the model, the smaller tier 2 shipbuilder purchased could
eventually become a competitor with the larger shipbuilders while exciting the
entrepreneurial community toward the shipbuilding industry and building an even
larger competitive base in the industry.
Taking equity stake in any company would require either a change to the FARs
or the use of a similar outside agency as IQT. While this could be difficult, the
upside is large. With a relatively small initial investment and low risk of failure, the
Navy could increase competition in the shipbuilding industry and better align the
interests of the shipbuilding industry more closely with the Navy's.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations
This research thesis analyzed four current Navy contracts and their incentive
structures as a way to increase competition and productivity in the U.S. military
shipbuilding industry which is currently dominated by 70% sole source contracts.
The analysis was done with incentives outside of monetary payoff in mind, but
also a look at the scale and alignment of the monetary payoffs with the intended
performances. The recommendations given for each of the incentive types
provided potential solutions to the misalignment of those incentives with the
outcome for which the U.S. Navy hoped. However, those recommendations
would potentially provide only a marginal improvement to the efficiency of
shipbuilding contracts by way of an improvement in cost reduction, quality, and
schedule adherence. Larger improvement would require a larger change in the
contracting process and the industry as a whole. This change is possible through
investment into the competitive base of the industry, which could potentially take
the form of a search fund initially as a vehicle to grow a tier 2 shipbuilder into a
tier 1 competitor.
Specific recommendations are as follows:
1. The Navy should invest in a search fund to take an equity stake in several tier
2 shipbuilders that can eventually be used to compete with tier 1 shipbuilders and
increase the competitive industrial base in shipbuilding. The initial investment is
low enough to mitigate risk at least at the outset and allow for multiple tier 2
shipbuilders to be vetted thoroughly for larger investments.
2. The search fund would be capitalized as an allocation through the Navy's
shipbuilding budget or as a portion of SIBIF, but maintained as a separately
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operating entity in order to be entitled to equity portions of the companies in
which it was invested in order to eventually become self sufficient.
3. When operating without the ability to increase the competitive base, Navy
contracts need to focus on the actual allocation of incentives. The Navy has
already moved away from the use of Cost Plus Award fee type contracts and the
current trend is to contract using the Fixed Price Incentive Contract type. This
type of contracting has allowed for the consolidation of smaller incentives that
might be easier to misalign when very subjective performance metrics are used
to measure their allocation and might be made irrelevant depending on the
relative scale of the incentives when compared to each other. Shipbuilders
rationally act based on their potential payoffs. The larger potential payoff for
creating a value to the Navy, the more important creating that value is to the
shipbuilder.
4. The Fixed Price Incentive contract promises a much larger potential payoff
then the smaller awards that might otherwise be possible. Consolidating those
awards in to just one large incentive for overall cost reduction and reducing it at
some percent based on missing concurrent and measurable quality and schedule
targets is a step toward offering a very large payoff. However, the largest
potential payoff for the shipbuilder comes from the longevity of a larger volume
program.
5. The larger the program, the more costs can be amortized across multiple ships
through economies of scale. It also provides a long and stable revenue source
for the shipbuilder which increases the attractiveness of further internal
investment. An extension, therefore, to the larger payoffs created by the Fixed
Price Incentive contracts would be to create even larger payoffs by removing
monetary incentives for individual ships and focusing those fund on more ships to
be constructed overall. This would require a large commitment on the part of the
Navy and the government to use those funds that it would have allocated as
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incentive directly for additional procurements. It also creates more periods for the
interactions of the Navy and the shipbuilder in which it would be more detrimental
for the shipbuilder not to make every effort possible to produce the value the
Navy is seeking (i.e. avoid defections from existing contract terms). It gives the
shipbuilders room to be creative in their own creation of ways to reduce costs
while maintaining quality and schedule adherence.
6. The lack of an incentive payment plan has the potential to produce cash flow
issues for the shipbuilder especially when they are considering capital
investments themselves for increased production efficiency. For this reason, a
capital investment provision should be maintained within the contracts, not as a
standalone incentive, but as an aid when the company would not otherwise be
able to invest in its own capacity.
Future work in this area includes the following research items:
- Expansion of the number of programs and contracts analyzed beyond the
four case studies in this thesis.
- Implementation of a software program for optimal shipbuilding contract
design based on the two major contract types and five interlinked contract
types identified here.
- Correlation of the manufacturing ecosystem recommendations of the
overall PIE study with the specific recommendations for strengthening the
tier 1 and tier 2 industrial base in US shipbuilding
- Development of a pre- and post-contract negotiations game that could
include between two and six stakeholders as both a training tool as well as
a way to identify potential improvements of future US shipbuilding
contracts
- Analysis of the potential for US commercial shipbuilding to expand due to
the enlargement of the Panama canal and the potential for a U.S. marine
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highway for coast-to-coast cargo shipping and ensuing positive spillover
effects from increased domestic commercial shipbuilding.
- Cost to benefit analysis of full nationalization of the shipbuilding industry in
the US
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Appendix
1. What are the standards by which you judge a program to be successful?
2. How does the DDG 1000 measure by that model?
3. Is changing the procurement schedule by stretching or decreasing the
number of ships the single biggest contributor to contract performance?
a. What other contractual features have the biggest impacts on
success?
4. How are those drivers controlled within the contract for the DDG 1000?
5. What are the limits for incentives for a particular contract? Is there a basic
formula used?
a. How would you structure the incentives differently if given the
opportunity?
6. How did you judge the Cost Plus v. Fixed Price Incentive contract to be
the best fit for the DDG 1000?
a. Would you have gone with the same contract type knowing what
you know now?
b. Can you affect those incentives once the contract has been
signed?
7. Does the formal change process vary for the DDG 1000 from other
programs?
a. Do you use incentives in change orders?
b. Are there acquisition requirements that limit how incentives might
be implemented on those?
8. Program Manager tour length is 4yrs. Should that be longer or shorter?
a. Is continuity to the leadership an important factor for program
success?
9. What are major affects of shipyards running at capacity?
a. Does a shipyard operating at lower than optimal capacity contribute
positively to the construction of a ship or does the government lose
on the associated overhead costs?
10. Should government terminate contracts for poor performance?
a. What should be done to contractors who are under performing?
b. Are there DoD regulations that prevent us from incentivizing better
performance or penalizing poor performance?
11. How are inefficiencies in the supply chain managed within the DDG 1000
program?
a. For GFE?
b. For Prime Contractors?
Ultimately, are there limitations that we are placing on ourselves that prevent us
from improving our contracting processes?
82
1. What are the standards by which you judge a program to be successful?
2. How does the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) measure by that model?
3. Is changing the procurement schedule by stretching or decreasing the
number of ships the single biggest contributor to contract performance?
a. What other contractual features have the biggest impacts on
success?
4. How are those drivers controlled within the contract for the LCS?
5. What are the limits for incentives for a particular contract? Is there a basic
formula used?
a. How would you structure the incentives differently if given the
opportunity?
6. How did you judge the Fixed Price Incentive v. Cost Plus contract to be
the best fit for the LCS?
a. Would you have gone with the same contract type knowing what
you know now?
b. Can you affect those incentives once the contract has been
signed?
c. On what factors was the Dual Award v. Downselect bidding process
chosen?
7. Does the formal change process vary for the LCS from other programs?
a. Do you use incentives in change orders?
b. Are there acquisition requirements that limit how incentives might
be implemented on those?
8. Program Manager tour length is 4yrs. Should that be longer or shorter?
a. Is continuity to the leadership an important factor for program
success?
9. What are major affects of shipyards running at capacity?
a. Does a shipyard operating at lower than optimal capacity contribute
positively to the construction of a ship or does the government lose
on the associated overhead costs?
10. Should government terminate contracts for poor performance?
a. What should be done to contractors who are under performing?
b. Are there DoD regulations that prevent us from incentivizing better
performance or penalizing poor performance?
11. How are inefficiencies in the supply chain managed within the LCS
program?
a. For GFE?
b. For Prime Contractors?
12. Ultimately, are there limitations that we are placing on ourselves that
prevent us from improving our contracting processes?
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1. What are the standards by which you judge a program to be successful?
2. How does the LPD 17 measure by that model?
3. Is changing the procurement schedule by stretching or decreasing the
number of ships the single biggest contributor to contract performance?
a. What other contractual features have the biggest impacts on
success?
4. How are those drivers controlled within the contract for the LPD 17?
5. How did you judge the Cost Plus v. Fixed Price Incentive contract to be
the best fit for the LPD 17?
a. Would you have gone with the same contract type knowing what
you know now?
6. What are the limits for incentives for a particular contract? Is there a basic
formula used?
a. How would you structure the incentives differently if given the
opportunity?
b. Can you affect those incentives once the contract has been
signed?
7. Does the formal change process vary for the LPD 17 from other
programs?
a. Do you use incentives in change orders?
b. Are there acquisition requirements that limit how incentives might
be implemented on those?
8. Program Manager tour length is 4yrs. Should that be longer or shorter?
a. Is continuity to the leadership an important factor for program
success?
9. What are major affects of shipyards running at capacity?
a. Does a shipyard operating at lower than optimal capacity contribute
positively to the construction of a ship or does the government lose
on the associated overhead costs?
10. Should government terminate contracts for poor performance?
a. What should be done to contractors who are under performing?
b. Are there DoD regulations that prevent us from incentivizing better
performance or penalizing poor performance?
11. How are inefficiencies in the supply chain managed within the LPD 17
program?
a. For GFE?
b. For Prime Contractors?
12. Ultimately, are there limitations that we are placing on ourselves that
prevent us from improving our contracting processes?
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1. What are the standards by which you judge a program to be successful?
2. How does the Virginia Class Submarine (VCS) measure by that model?
3. Is changing the procurement schedule by stretching or decreasing the
number of ships the single biggest contributor to contract performance?
a. What other contractual features have the biggest impacts on
success?
4. How are those drivers controlled within the contract for the VCS?
5. What are the limits for incentives for a particular contract? Is there a basic
formula used?
a. How would you structure the incentives differently if given the
opportunity?
6. How did you judge the Cost Plus v. Fixed Price Incentive contract to be
the best fit for the VCS?
a. Would you have gone with the same contract type knowing what
you know now?
b. Can you affect those incentives once the contract has been
signed?
7. Does the formal change process vary for the VCS from other programs?
a. Do you use incentives in change orders?
b. Are there acquisition requirements that limit how incentives might
be implemented on those?
8. Program Manager tour length is 4yrs. Should that be longer or shorter?
a. Is continuity to the leadership an important factor for program
success?
9. What are major affects of shipyards running at capacity?
a. Does a shipyard operating at lower than optimal capacity contribute
positively to the construction of a ship or does the government lose
on the associated overhead costs?
10. Should government terminate contracts for poor performance?
a. What should be done to contractors who are under performing?
b. Are there DoD regulations that prevent us from incentivizing better
performance or penalizing poor performance?
11. How are inefficiencies in the supply chain managed within the VCS
program?
a. For GFE?
b. For Prime Contractors?
12. Were there any major inefficiencies identified by the VCS cost reduction
effort?
a. Are there limits to how those cost reduction efforts can be
incentivized and implemented?
13. What positive effects did the CAPEX program have on the acquisition of
the VCS?
14. Ultimately, are there limitations that we are placing on ourselves that
prevent us from improving our contracting processes?
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1. Cost Cutting Incentives
1. What sorts of assurances are in place to ensure that a company doesn't
take full advantage of their cost reduction measures to increase their own
profit without reducing the Navy price? Other than:
a. Changing share line
b. Full cost transparency
c. Is there full cost transparency?
2. What incentivizes a company to reduce cost even though they are not only
putting in the effort on the front end of this contract, but will also affect
future bids by analogy?
3. Could a steady focus on designing the ship completely before building
ever be achieved?
a. How would that reduce total ownership costs v. acquisition?
4. How discretionary are the cost cutting measurements?
a. Could there potentially be less of a fixed formula for those
measurements?
b. What might that look like?
II. Potential Innovation
5. What sorts of incentives exist beyond a budget for R&D to promote
innovation within the shipyards?
6. Do you think that more competition between shipyards is the right answer
to produce the most cost effective solution, or could a consolidation across
the board and a single shipyard put more pressure on the industry to
provide cost effective solutions?
a. A free market is the most efficient for industries, but is the illusion of
a free market in this industry creating higher overall and especially
transaction costs?
7. What drawbacks have you seen in block buys from contracts?
a. Can economies of scale potentially limit innovation?
Ill. Standardization and Shipyard Refinement
8. Why do companies increase their leverage and spend the additional funds
necessary to improve their facilities?
a. Are there any practices in place or in the near future to incentivize
such behavior?
9. Does a separation of maintenance and construction make sense?
a. Could this establish more standardization of components and fewer
issues with replacement?
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